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What is the future of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)? While the future of the 
Act is uncertain, it is certain that it will be decided in Washington D C. This paper will 
explore the future of the ESA during and after the reauthorization process, especially the 
two most disputed sections of the ESA: section 9 which prohibits private actions that 
adversely affect endangered species and section 10 which provides an exception to the 
ESA through Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs).
To predict how these disputed sections might fare in the reauthorization process, I 
will look specifically at
a. the Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon 
decision, especially the dissent’s strong language in favor of property rights rather than 
species protection;
b. the political makeup of Congress as members of the majority Republican party 
have, like the dissent in Babbitt, keyed on protecting property rights through 
reauthorization; and
c. the possibility of Congress’ failure to reauthorize the ESA and how this failure 
might lead to a role for the Administration in shaping the debate over the future of the 
ESA
L Introduction
Species protection comes about in many ways Here in the United States, we all 
do our part to protect species: as landowners allowing species to live and thrive on our 
property; as activists advocating for the protection of a particular species; as consumers in 
a global marketplace, choosing not to buy certain products such as ivory. Another way
1
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we protect species is by voting. Citizens of this country can (and sometimes even do) vote 
for the elected representatives who serve for us in our democracy. These politicians 
represent many interests while serving as United States Senators, Representatives, and 
Preâdent in Washington D C These elected representatives play important roles in 
protecting species by enacting laws, and thus, we can protect species by voting for or 
against these representatives.
The law synonymous with species protection is the Endangered Species Act.
Given current concerns over how the ESA affects private property rights, the political 
makeup of Congress, and the Administration’s expanding role in species protection, it is 
likely the ESA wll change through the reauthorization process. The question then 
becomes, will this change cause the ESA to remain a substantive statute with the teeth to 
require compliance with its mandates? Or, on the other hand, will the Act become more 
procedural in nature through the reauthorization process, a list of lofty goals rather than a 
set of hard and fast rules?
My prediction is that the ESA will become less of a forceful law as opposing 
groups are going to have to compromise on species protection in order to achieve 
reauthorization.
n . History and Bacl^round of the ESA
The Endangered Species Act is the most significant and substantive set of laws 
designed to protect endangered plant and animal species ever produced by Congress. The 
United States Supreme Court went so far as to describe the ESA as “the most 
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
nation.”* Since it was signed into law in 1973, the ESA has matured into a powerful 
federal wildlife conservation mandate. This strong mandate has alarmed many private 
landowners who fear that their lands may be annexed by government regulation in order to 
realize habitat conservation. The very nature of the ESA’s powerful conservation 
mandate and the public controversy that it has caused may endanger the Act’s future.
A. 16 u  s  e . § 1531: The Purpose of the ESA
The ESA is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 . The purpose of this Act is “to 
provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened 
species depend may be conserved . . .  [and] to provide a program for the conservation of 
such endangered species and threatened species . . .  .”^
“Endangered species” is defined as “any species which is in danger of extinction 
throughout all or a significant portion of its range . . .  “Threatened species” is defined 
as “any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable 
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.
With the enactment of the ESA, Congress for the first time recognized that there is 
value in protecting threatened and endangered species. Whether these species somehow 
provide a cure for cancer or are just pretty to look at, the Act served as a confirmation of
*TVA V. Hill. 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
^16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) 0996) (hereinafter, all statutory cites to the ESA will be 
abbreviated. Using this example: ESA § 2).
^ESA § 3.
"ESA § 3.
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America’s inherent belief that living species are more valuable than extinct species. In its 
present form, the ESA provides tangible provisions that requires all of us to do what we 
can to conserve threatened and endangered species.
B. Section 9 of the ESA: Protection Against Private Action 
A cursory study of the ESA and its case law suggests that the Act applies mainly 
to federal actions taken on federal lands. Section 7 of the ESA supports this assumption 
as it applies strictly to federal actions.^ Much of the case law surrounds federal projects or 
nuyor projects taking place on federal lands.̂  While the focus of the ESA may be on 
federal actions, the Act’s species conservation mandate also implicates private actions 
taken on private lands.
More than 50 percent of the listed plant and animal species are found only on 
private land.’ Section 9 of the ESA prohibits private action that would adversely affect 
threatened or endangered species.' The ESA makes it unlawful for any person to take any 
listed species of plants or animals.  ̂ “Take” means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot.
*See generally ESA § 7.
®For examples, see TVA v Hill. 437 U.S. 153 (1978), Thomas v. Peterson. 753 F.2d 754 
(9th Cir. 1985), and Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel. 716 F Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 
1988).
’Hank Fisher & Wendy Hudson, Building Economic Incentives into the Endangered 
Species Act, in Defenders of Wildlife i, vii (1993).
•ESA § 9.
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wound, kill, trap, cf^ture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.’® 
“Take” is also expansively defined to prohibit takings of listed species, even when that 
taking is incidental to other actions.”
C. Section 10 of the ESA; Habitat Conservation Plans 
Though Section 9 was rarely enforced against incidental takings by private actions. 
Congress created an exception to this prohibition.’̂  In 1982, Section 10(a) was added 
allowing the Secretary of the Interior to issue incidental take permits to private actors 
In order to receive an incidental take permit, the private actor had to submit a Habitat 
Conservation Plan (HCP) to the Secretary.’̂  An HOP must state how the private actor 
plans to minimize the impact of the taking and assure the Secretary that the private action 
“will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in 
the wild."’'
Lack of enforcement aside, the mere possibility of enforcement of the incidental 
take prohibition led to a legal challenge concerning a definition promulgated by the 
Secretary of the Interior.’® Under the Secretary’s expansive definition of “take,” “harm”
’®ESA § 3.
’’Robert V. Percival, Alan S. Miller, Christopher H. Schroeder, & James P. Leape, 
Environmental Regulation: Law. Science, and Policy 1220 (1996) (hereinafter Percival).
at 1221.
"Id.
"liL
"ESA § 10(aK2)(BXiv).
**Percival at 1221.
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was interpreted to mean an act which kills or injures wildlife, including actions that would 
modify or degrade habitat that would result in the death of or injury to wildlife." This 
expansive definition caused some private landowners to worry that the prohibition against 
habitat degradation may affect their property rights and possibly the value of their land 
These worries led to the Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. 
Babbitt litigation."
in. The Application of the ESA to Private Actions
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service made the decision to list the northern spotted 
owl under the ESA on July 23, 1990." This decision to protect the owl also served to 
protect the range of the spotted owl. Following the listing of the owl, 6.9 million acres of 
the oid-growth forest that it called home was placed off-limits to logging.^ The listing of 
the spotted owl and the protection of its habitat led to litigation that has had a lasting 
effect on the reauthorization debate.
A. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chanter for a Great Oregon
In 1992, a group of private landowners, log^ng companies, and some other 
groups challenged the regulatory definition of “harm” promulgated by the Secretary of the
"Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon. 115 S. Ct. 2407, 
2407-09 (1995) (hereinafter Sweet HomeV
" Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt. 806 F Supp. 279 
(1992).
'̂ Determination of Threatened Status for the Northern Spotted Ovd; Final Rule, 55 Fed. 
Reg. 26114-194(1990).
determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl; Final Rule, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 1796-838 (1992).
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Interior.̂ * These organizations specifically challei^ed the application of 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 
to the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker and to the threatened northern spotted 
owl.“  These groups argued that the protection of these species on their private lands 
harmed them financially.^ The District Court granted the defendants* motion for 
summary judgment declaring that Congress wanted the Secretary’s expansive 
interpretation of “harm” in the definition of “take” to include habitat modification.̂ ^
In July 1993, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the D C Circuit initially rejected 
the challenge to the District Court’s ruling.̂ ® However, six months later, one judge 
changed his mind and reversed the panel’s earlier decision.^ Applying the legal principle 
of noscitur a sociis, where the meaning of a word is determined by reference to the 
meaning of other words associated with it in the statute, the panel determined that the 
word “harm” could not be interpreted to include habitat modification.^
The government’s petition for rehearing en banc was denied, forcing them to seek
Sweet Home at 2408. 
“ Id at 2410.
“ Id
“ Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt. 806 F. Supp. 279
(1992).
“ Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt. 1 F.3d 1 (D C Cir. 
1993), vacated on petition for rehg., 17 F 3d 1463 (1994).
“ Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt. 17 F.3d 1463 
(D C. Cir. 1994).
“Percival at 1221.
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review from the United States Supreme Court.“  The Supreme Court granted review and 
issued the Sweet Home decision on the last day of its 1994-95 term.^
In Sweet Home, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals holding that 
the Secretary did not exceed his tuithority under the ESA in promulgating § 17.3 and that 
the Secretary’s definition of "harm" was in accord with Congressional intent and with the 
ESA’s text, structure, and legislative history."
The majority of the Supreme Court made the technically correct legal 
determination in holding that the Secretary’s definition was compatible with the intent of 
the ESA. Habitat modification can lead to the extinction of threatened and endangered 
species, therefore the Secretary had to include this language in the section having to do 
with the taking of species. Degradation of habitat may have more of an effect on listed 
species than hunting and killing. It takes far longer for a modified ecosystem to regenerate 
than it does for plants and animals to reproduce. Regardless of the logic behind the 
majority’s decision, the dissent took issue with the holding arguing that private 
landowners would bear the burden of this definition promulgated by the Secretary.
B. The Sweet Home Dissent: Impacts on Private Landowners 
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice 
Clarence Thomas in the dissent, wrote that the ESA "(I) forbade the hunting and killing of 
endangered animals, and (2) provided federal lands and federal funds for the acquisition of
"IdL
"Sweet Home. 115 S. Ct at 2412-16.
8
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private lands, to preserve the habitat of endangered animals.” '̂ The dissent went on to say 
that the nuyority’s holding that the prohibition against hunting and killing incidentally 
preserves habitat on private lands “imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin — not 
just upon the rich, but upon the rimplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national 
zoological use.”“
Justice Scalia also wrote that the ESA “is a carefiilly considered piece of legislation 
that forbids all persons to hunt or harm endangered animals, but places upon the public at 
large, rather than upon fortuitously accountable individual landowners, the cost of 
preserving the habitat of endangered species.”^̂  Translated, this means that if private 
property is to be affected by the ESA, the individual landowner should not have to 
shoulder the entire financial burden. Taxpayers should have to pay for preserving habitat 
on private lands, perhaps through the land acquisition program specified in Section 5 of 
the Act.
While this issue was resolved in the courts, much to the frustration of the more 
conservative element of the Supreme Court, the battleground has now shifted from the 
halls of justice to the halls of Congress. The disagreements in the judicial branch of 
government were harbingers of disagreements taking place in the legislative branch. 
Disagreements over the ESA are in the process of being remedied by Congress through 
reauthorization.
%  at 2421. 
“14
%  at 2431.
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rv. Congressional Reauthorization of the ESA
Since Congress enacted the ESA in 1973, no other act has protected threatened 
and endangered species with such force. Some acts incidentally protect species but no 
other law directly conserves endangered species like the ESA.^ Whether protecting a 
three inch snail darter perch at the expense of a major federal dam project (albeit for only a 
short time) or conserving the habitat of the northern spotted owl by limiting the logging of 
old-growth forests, the ESA continues as a powerful tool for species conservation and 
protection.^*
But the ESA may be as endangered as some of the plant and animal species it is 
designed to protect. The ESA’s authorization to spend money expired on October 1,
1 9 9 2  36 The last four Congresses have tried and failed to reauthorize the ESA. Instead, 
Congress has appropriated money to the ESA ensuring that the Act remains operational 
while only delaying its inevitable and necessary reauthorization.^^ Once again, the 
pressure is on Congress to reauthorize the ESA, especially in the wake of the Sweet Home 
holding and the effects of ESA enforcement on private landowners.
The ESA’s success as a strong statute has led to calls from private property
*^There are many examples, but see generally the National Environmental Policy Act (42 
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d) and the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387).
**See generally TVA v. Hill. 437 U.S. 153 (1978) and Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel. 
716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
*^anya L. Godfrey, The Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act: A Hotlv 
Contested Dd>ate. 98 W Va. L. Rev. 979 (1996) (hereinafter Godfrey) (footnote 
omitted).
%  at 980.
10
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advocates for significant changes that would weaken the Act." Developers of private land 
have supported weakening the ESA because compliance can lead to the cancellation of 
projects or significant changes to their proposals "  Any time there is the potential for the 
take of a threatened or endangered species, projects can be stopped regardless of the 
amount of time and money that has been invested.^ Perhaps Asristant Secretary of the 
Interior George Frampton best summarized how some private landowners feel about the 
ESA: “From a private landowner’s point of view, the Endangered Species Act looks like 
a nuclear weapon.” '̂
Because of the criticisms the ESA is receiving fi-om the private property rights’ 
perspective, the reauthorization process has, and will certainly continue, to spark a very 
contentious debate in Congress Precious little of this ddmte will focus on federal 
agencies’ and private landowners’ duties to conserve threatened and endangered species. 
Instead the dd^ate has primarily centered on reducing the burden suffered by private 
landowners at the hands of the ESA.*  ̂ Each private landowner who opposes the ESA 
represents a vote to those in Congress currently tasked with the reauthorization of the
"Id
"M. Neil Browne & Nancy K. Kubasek, The Endangered Species Act: An Evaluation of 
Alternative Approaches. 3 Dick. J. Envtl. L. & Pol y 5 (1994) (footnote omitted).
*®Eric Fisher, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: No 
Surprises and the Quest for Certaintv. 67 U. Colo L Rev. 371, 377 (1996).
‘̂William K. Stevens, Future of the Endangered Species Act in Doubt as Law Is Debated. 
N.Y. Times, May 16, 1995, at C4.
^^Major Ayres, Endangered Species Act Update. Army Law., Dec. 1995, at 84.
11
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Act. Advocates for private landowners have mobilized. Groups, such as Defenders of 
Property Rights,*  ̂the National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition (NESARC),** 
and Citizens for Private Property Rights^* oppose many of the provisions of the ESA and 
will almost certainly influence the future of the ESA as they work to ensure policies 
favorable to their interests. These individual landowners and their advocates could play 
the biggest role in shaping the future of the ESA under the reauthorization process as any 
and all public disapproval surrounding the ESA may endanger the Act’s Congressional 
reauthorization.
A. Past Congressional Reauthorization Bills
A number of reauthorization bills were introduced in previous Congresses.^ Some 
of them called for weakening the ESA while others suggested only minor changes to an
^^Richard Carelli, Endangered Species Act Cuts Both Wavs. Missoulian, March 20, 1997, 
at Al, AID.
**See the National Endangered Species Act Reform Coalition Internet site; 
http://www.nesarc.org. NESARC holds itself out as a broad-based coalition of over 200 
member organizations representing millions of individuals across the United States, 
dedicated to bringing balance back to the Endangered Species Act. Their membership 
includes rural iirigators, municipalities, farmers, electric utilities and other individuals 
and organizations directly affected by the ESA
*®See the “Citizens for Private Property Rights” Internet site; http;//members.aol. 
com/proprts/cppr/ESA.html. This group argues “that ESA reform is long overdue and 
absolutely essential because in its present form it fosters and engenders moral corruption, 
such as leading people to not adhere to the "Thou shalt not steal" concept. It is also 
leading people to help destroy our Constitution and our Constitutional lights and the 
Country itself! No life of any insignificant creature is worth that!”
^For examples, see Common Sense Amendments for All Endangered Species Act, S. 
1152, 104th Cong. (1995); Endangered Species Act Reform Act of 1995, S. 768, 104th 
Cong. (1995); Endangered Species Improvement Act of 1993, H R 1992, 103rd Cong.
(1993); Endangered Species Protection Act of 1991, H R. 6 1 ,103rd Cong. (1991).
12
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otherwise effective act. Several bills addressed private landowners* concerns with the 
ESA.*  ̂ All of them tWled.
For instance, in the 104th Congress, bills were introduced with provisions that 
would have expressly overruled the Sweet Home holding, compensated private 
landowners for restrictions placed on their land because of compliance with the ESA, and 
provided incentives for landowners if they took steps to comply with the ESA.** But the 
bill that seemed to receive the most attention reflected the point made in the Sweet Home 
dissent: that private land should not be “conscripted to national zoological use” under any 
circumstances.
H.R. 2275: Endangered Species Conservation and Management Act of 1995
H R 2275 was a high profile bill in the 104th Congress. The “Endangered Species 
Conservation and Management Act of 1995,” also known as the Young-Pombo bill, was 
submitted by Representative Don Young (R-Alaska) and Representative Richard Pombo 
(R-Cdifomia).*® Though the bill was unsuccessful, the popularity of the bill could be 
inferred by its large number of co-sponsors, 127,*® and the degree of media attention it 
received for its proposed sweeping changes to the ESA.**
*’For example, see the Private Property Owners’ Bill of Rights, S. 953, 105th Cong. 
(1997) (introduced in the last three sessions under the same title).
**Godfrey at 1004.
*%R 2275, 104th Cong. (1996).
**ïd
*‘Godfrey at 1005.
13
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Like other bills, the Young-Pombo bill would have required the government to 
compensate private landowners who were adversely affected by the ESA/^ Its 
compensatoiy requirements would go into effect when an agency action under the ESA 
diminished the value of affected private property by at least twenty percent/^ If the 
property value were diminished by more than SO percent, the government would be 
required to pay the fair market value for the land at the request of the landowner.^ This 
statutory compensation requirement was more reaching than the takings clause of the 
Constitution which only compensates landowners when the government takes most, if not 
all, of the possible economic use of the land."
Another provision in the Young-Pombo bill would have overturned the holding in 
Sweet Home that confirmed the Secretary's definition of "harm" as an act which kills or 
injures wildlife, which may include habitat modification that results in the killing or 
injuring of wildlife." The bill would have changed the definition of “harm” to be “a direct 
action against any member of an endangered species . . .  that actually injures or kills a 
member of the species.*’ Habitat modification would not be considered a “direct action”
*4l.R 2275, 104th Cong Title I (1995). 
"I&
**See generally the U.S. Const, amend. V (“private property [shall not] be taken for 
public use without just compensation”) and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 
112S. Ct. 2886(1992).
"See generally Sweet Home at 2407-09.
*’H.R. 2275, 104th Cong. § 202 (1995) (emphasis added).
14
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against an endangered species. Thus, this provision would have severely restricted an 
important means of habitat conservation on private land.
While receiving the support of private landowners* advocates, many others 
thought the Young-Pombo bill too extreme. Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt said 
that the Young-Pombo bill “would effectively repeal the ESA.”** With the focus of this 
bill on compensating private landowners for complying with the ESA, it is no surprise that 
there was intense debate over this proposed legislation. As was the case in previous 
sessions of Congress, partisan debate over bills like H R 2275 led to the stalemate of the 
reauthorization process.*’ The reauthorization process did not proceed any smoother in 
the 105th Congress as Congress again failed to reauthorize the ESA.
B. Reauthorization Bills in the 105th Congress
With the failure of the ESA to be reauthorized in the previous three Congresses,
expectations were high for the 105th Congress to be more successful. The ESA sparked
heated debate in the 105th Congress, with both praise and harsh words coming from the
Congressmen and women charged with reauthorizing the Act:
“The ESA is our most important law to protect our Nation’s natural resources and 
biological diversity, and has often been referred to as the “crown jewel” of 
environmental laws.” Senator John Chafee (R-Rhode Island)^
“The [Endangered Species Act] can be improved, both for the species it is
**Godfrey at 1008.
*’J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(AVT> of the “New” Endangered Species Act: Rediscovering *md 
Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies’ Dutv to Conserve Species. 25 
Envtl. L. 1107, 1153(1995).
*®143 Cong. Rec. S9421 (daily ed. September 16,1997) (statement of Sen. Chafee).
15
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deâgned to protect and for ranchers, farmers, and other private landowners.”
Senator Max Baucus (D^Montana), Ranking Democrat, Senate Environment and 
Public Works Committee‘s
“The Endangered Species Act — when it comes to the protection of life and 
property — really needs a second look ” Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Califomia)‘^
“I am sorely disappointed in the way that [the ESA], with its good goal, has been 
abused by environmentalists . . .  who use this law not to protect wildlife and 
endangered species, but to control the use of lands.” Congressman Don Young 
(R-Alaska)®®
“Groups that are way out here on the fringe. ..have figured out a way to use [the 
ESA] to now impose power, their personal agenda, over communities across the 
country.” Congressman Henry Bonilla (R-Texas)^*
“When it comes to a garter snake versus somebody's home and property and life 
and limb, I really think we need to get our priorities straight.” Senator Dianne 
Feinstein (D-Califomia)‘®
With such divisive language, especially from critics of the ESA, it is not surprising
that the ESA again failed to be reauthorized in the 105th Congress. With the fêlure of
Congress to reauthorize the ESA, it is now the job of future Congresses to reauthorize the
ESA. By looking at the bills introduced in the 105th Congress and why they failed, one
can gain an idea of how the ESA may be reauthorized in the 106th Congress.
S. 1180: The Endangered Species Recovery Act of 1997
On September 16, 1997, in the first session of the 105th Congress, United States
“ 143 Cong. Rec. S9423 (daily ed. September 16, 1997) (statement of Sen. Baucus). 
“ 143 Cong. Rec. S4177 (daily ed. May 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
“ 143 Cong. Rec. H2283 (daily ed. May 7, 1997) (statement of Rep. Young).
“ 143 Cong. Rec. H2298 (daily ed. May 7, 1997) (statement of Rep. Bonilla).
“ 143 Cong. Rec. S4177 (daily ed. May 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
16
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Senators Dirk Kempthome (R-Idaho), John Chafee (R-Rhode Island), Harry Reid (D- 
Nevada), and Montana’s own Max Baucus (D-Montana) introduced the “Endangered 
Species Recovery Act of 1997.”“  Senate Bill 1180 was a popular bill as inferred by its 
bipartisan support and 18 co-sponsors, including powerful Republican Senators like Orrin 
Hatch (R-Utah) and Jesse Helms (R-Noith Carolina).
The Endangered Species Recovery Act made a number of compromises between 
conflicting interests. It required the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce, as 
appropriate, to use the best scientific and commercial data available in making 
determinations as to whether a species should be listed as threatened or endangered, 
giving greater weight to peer-reviewed, field-tested, or empirical data when evaluating 
comparable data.*’ It would have set up a framework to de-list a previously threatened or 
endangered species when the goals of the recovery plan had been met.®* It would have 
also implemented a private property owners educational and technical assistance program 
to help them preserve threatened and endangered species®̂  and would have provided 
grants to private landowners who create, restore, or improve threatened and endangered 
species habitat.™
Probably the most contested provision of S. 1180 was the “no surprises” clause.
“ S. 1180, 105th Cong. (1997). 
®’Id  at§3 .
®*Idat§2.
® ^ a t § 7 .
% a t § 5 .
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The no surprises clause would have ensured that a landowner who entered into an HCP 
would "not be required to undertake any additional mitigation measures for species 
covered by [the HCP] if such measures would require the payment of additional money, or 
the adoption of additional use, development or management restrictions on any land .. . 
without the consent of the [landowner] The no surprises clause was a concession to 
private landowners who participate in the HCP process. When the government and a 
landowner conumt to an HCP, it is similar to a contract between the two parties. Like a 
contract, the parties want the promises contained in the HCP to be binding on the other 
party.
Landowners that receive an HCP from the government in order to develop their 
lands want to ensure that the government puts no further restrictions on their property 
than those already contained in the HCP.^ Essentially, once landowners have entered into 
a deal with the government, they want “no surprises” to come up later. According to 
Interior Secretary Babbitt, “Landowners with private or commercial land have a legitimate 
concern. They want some assurance that once they agree to be a party to an HCP and to 
mitigate the effects of their activities on listed species, we won't come back later for a 
second bite from the apple.””
The problem with HCPs and assuring landowners that there will be no surprises is
"'Id.at§5(cX5XB).
”John H. Cushman, Jr., The Endangered Species Act Gets a Makeover. N.Y. Times, June 
2, 1998, at D2.
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that the situation may change for threatened and endangered species in the future. HCPs 
remain effective for a long time with some HCPs not scheduled to expire for 80 years.̂ ^
If an HCP &ils to provide for any harmful changes that occur in those 80 years, the 
government would not be able to intervene and help threatened and endangered species 
that were adversely affected by those changes. The no surprises clause effectively repeals 
the ESA on lands covered by an HCP for the time-period it specifies. Those lands would 
stay open to development under the HCP at the expense of endangered species even if the 
HCP failed to mitigate impacts on a species or even directly leads to its extinction. 
Developers would get all of the benefit of their development while the public would get all 
of the risk in the form of species extinction. But as Secretary Babbitt has said, “A deal is 
a deal.”’*
Like every other reauthorization bill before the 105th Congress, Senate Bill 1180 
failed. This was somewhat surprising though given the bipartisan support that this bill 
enjoyed. How a popular bill such as this one fWled offers perhaps the best glimpse as to 
why Congress has had no success reauthorizing the ESA.
The Failure of S. 1180
Senate Bill 1180 had little difficulty passing through the Senate Environment and
’‘John H. Cushman, Jr., The Endangered Species Act Gets a Makeover. N.Y. Times, June 
2, 1998, at 02.
’*An idea also reflected in Kristin Shrader-Frechette & Earl D. McCoy, Method in 
Ecology 161-62 (Cambridge University Press 1993).
’*John H. Cushman, Jr., The Endangered Species Act Gets a Makeover. N.Y. Times, June 
2, 1998, at 02.
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Public Worics Committee by a 15-3 vote.”  The bill was supported by every Republican 
member of the committee, a majority of the Democratic members, and was also strongly 
supported by the Clinton administration.”  With so much support and so little opposition, 
why did this bill fail to pass? The main reason is that the Senate never really had the 
chance to debate and vote on this bill.
Senate Bill 1180 was on the Senate calendar for about a year and did not get 
considered.”  In an attempt to have it be heard. Senator Kempthome (R-Idaho) planned to 
offer the bill as an amendment to the Interior Appropriations Bill.*” But the Senate 
stopped considering the Interior Appropriations Bill and thus Senate Bill 1180 could not 
be offered as an amendment.'̂  Senator Baucus then asked the Senate to take up Senate 
Bill 1180 as a freestanding bill.'^ The Senate again did not hear it.
This bill was not considered because the Republican leadership did not allow the 
Senate to consider this bill Until very late in the session. Senate Majority Leader Trent 
Lott (R-Mississippi) did not want to bring this bill up for a vote on the Senate floor as it 
did not have certain provisions that he wanted to see." In the words of a member of
” 144 Cong Rec. SI0577 (daily ed. September 18, 1998) (statement of Sen. Baucus). 
’•Id.
"Id.
"Id.
“telephone Interview with Brian Kuehl, Senator Baucus* Legislative Aide for Natural 
Resource Issues (November 3, 1998).
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Senator Baucus’ staff. Senator Lott did not like Senate Bill 1180 because it "did not 
weaken the ESA enough."** Senator Lott’s main sticking point with this piece of 
legislation and all legislation having to do with the ESA is the effect of the ESA on private 
property rights.**
Senator Baucus said he would oppose any amendments that would disrupt the 
delicate balance of the bill under an agreement he reached with the very divergent group 
with whom he had put the bill together: Senators Kempthome, Chafee, Reid and Interior 
Secretary Babbitt.** With people representing differing interests having drafted the bill, it 
is not surprising that Senator Lott disrupted this tenuous balance in insisting on 
amendments that would weaken the bill by staunchly protecting private property rights. 
When the coalition that put the bill together disagreed with Senator Lott, he exercised his 
authority by not allowing Senate Bill 1180 to be voted on by the Senate.*^
Senate Bill 1180 was probably the 105th Congress’ best chance of reauthorizing
**WL
**See his Fifth Amendment rhetoric in an ESA debate: The Constitution “is very clear 
and unambiguous. It says: *... nor shall private property be taken for public use without 
just compensation.’ The Constitution is very clear. And yet all across this country, 
privately owned property, including a lot of farmers' private property, and the private 
property of businessmen and individuals, is being taken pursuant to government action 
without just compensation. In many instances for so-called good and valid reasons—for 
example, to preserve wetlands or to protect endangered species. Such takings may, upon 
examination, be legitimate, but not if private property is taken from the property owner 
in an inappropriate way and without just compensation. ” 144 Cong. Rec. S7929 (daily 
ed. July 10, 1998) (statement of Sen. Lott).
**144 Cong. Rec S10577 (daily ed. September 18, 1998) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
*’Telephone Interview wth Brian Kuehl, Senator Baucus’ Legislative Aide for Natural 
Resource Issues (November 3, 1998).
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the ESA. Any group interested in the reauthorization of the ESA in the future must learn 
from what happened to Senate Bill 1180. In the case of this bill, the Senate Majority 
Leader had the ability to ensure it never was voted on by the Senate. While Senator Lott 
had initial concerns with the bill, once those concerns were allayed, it was too late to 
consider it as Congress was consumed with passing the Omnibus Appropriations Bill.**
Given the popularity of Senate Bill 1180, it may be reintroduced in the 106th 
Congress with little, or only minor changes.*® There is a major problem in reintroducing 
Senate Bill 1180 though as Senator Kempthome, the lead Republican sponsor of the bill, 
is now Governor of Idaho. Senator Kempthome was the driving force in the Republican 
party on Senate Bill 1180 and there does not appear to be a Republican to step in to take 
his place as lead sponsor.®® Supposedly Senator Kempthome had brought in Senator 
Chafee begrudgingly as a lead sponsor and Senator Chafee will be unwilling to be the lead 
Republican sponsor on his own.®* Without a strong Republican to be a lead sponsor of 
Senate Bill 1180, the bill would probably have little chance of passing.
Senate Bill 1180, with its bipartisan support, struck a very delicate balance 
between those concemed with maintmning a relatively strong ESA and those owning 
private land.®̂  Because of this delicate balance, even the slightest of problems, real or
"I&
*̂ dL
®®Telephone interview with Jack Mingus, lobbyist for NES ARC (November 12, 1998), 
®*I4
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perceived, caused this bill to fail.”  Even if Senate Bill 1180 is reintroduced in the 106th 
Congress now that Senator Lott’s concerns have been met, passage is not assured as even 
the slightest problems seem to be able to upset the balance.
Besides the possibility of seeing Senate Bill 1180 reintroduced, we can also expect 
to see bills introduced in the 106th Congress with the primary goal of protecting property 
rights. Here is a sampling of bills that may be reintroduced:
S. 953: The Private Property Owners* Bill of Rights 
For the past three sessions, bills were introduced to specifically protect the 
interests of private property owners. The 105th Congress was no different as four 
Senators, including Senator Jesse Helms, cosponsored Senate Bill 953: the “Private 
Property Owners’ Bill of Rights.” This legislation would have required Federal agency 
heads to administer and implement the ESA and Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(FWPCA, otherwise known as the Clean Water Act) in a manner that least affects private 
property owners’ constitutional and other legal rights.”  The bill also included common- 
sense points such as requiring Federal agencies to obtain the consent of property owners 
and provide notice before entering privately-owned property in order to collect 
information on it .”  If a property owner was deprived of $10,000 or 20% of the fmr 
market value of their land as a consequence of an agency enforcing the ESA or FWPCA,
”14
” S. 953, 105th Cong. § 4 (1997).
’*14 at §5.
23
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the property owner would be entitled to compensation.^ And finally, the Act would have 
given private property owners the ability to dispute any data collected on their land before 
the data could be used in implementing either the ESA or FWPCA on the private land.”  
Senate Bill 953 would have allowed private property owners the right to an 
administrative appeal whenever their land would be affected by a government action.”  
These government actions would include a determination that the property is critical 
habitat of a threatened or endangered species; the denial of an incidental take permit; the 
imposition of an administrative penalty; and the imposition of an order that prohibits or 
limits the use of the property.”
The Private Property Owners’ Bill of Rights was little more than a declaration of a 
fundamental Constitutional right. This bill was clearly grounded in the Fifth Amendment 
principle that prohibits the taking of private property without the payment of just 
compensation. Obvious problems with this bill were the ability of landowners to 
effectively choose not to comply with the ESA by not allowing Federal agencies the 
opportunity to come on to their land. Further, the power to dispute government data 
would have given landowners the ability to stall enforcement of the ESA for months and 
possibly years. Given that the goal of the ESA is to protect endangered species, stalling 
the mandates of the Act could stall a species out of existence.
” ldLat§9.
” l j la t§ 6 .
” I i a t§ 8 .
%
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s. 1181: The Endangered Species Habitat Protection Act of 1997 
Senate BUI 1181, known as the Endangered Species Habitat Protection Act of 
1997, primarily would have amended the tax laws to provide tax incentives to owners of 
environmentally sensitive lands to enter into conservation easements that would provide 
for species protection. Under this bill, sponsored by Senator Kempthome, if landowners 
agreed to manage their land in a manner that preserves endangered species, the 
landowners would be entitled to a tax credit of up to $50,000.*^ If this bill were to be 
reintroduced, it would have to be reintroduced by another Congressman as Senator 
Kempthome was elected Govemor of Idaho in the 1998 election.
As was the case in previous sessions, there were dozens of bills introduced in the 
105 th Congress to reauthorize and change the ESA Just as before, none of these bills 
were enacted. While there is no concrete answer for why Congress has continually failed 
to reauthorize the ESA, one possibility is that Republicans and Democrats disagree on 
environmental issues to such an extent that major environmental legislation is almost 
impossible to pass. The majority Republican party has experienced difficulties with its 
environmental agenda.'^' This being one of the Republican’s few weaknesses, perhaps 
Congressional Democrats have decided to take a stand on environmental issues. The 
Republicans, in a power display, may be unwilling to show weakness on any issue. WhUe 
disagreements over legislation is nothing new in the two-party system, I believe that the
100.S. 1181, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997).
*®‘Brent Walth, Environment in Congress Has Changed Since *94. The Oregonian, March 
17, 1997, Al, A7.
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debate over reauthorization has been, and will continue to be, especially contentious. The 
contentious nature of the dd>ate will almost surely lead to the use of backlash politics by 
the political parties.
C. Backlash Politics and the Effects on the Reauthorization Debate
The ESA is not being reauthorized in a vacuum. The ESA is being reauthorized in 
Congress where many interests figure in any legislative debate. To understand how the 
ESA may be reauthorized, one must look at Congress in the context of its dealing with 
environmental issues. While this section generalizes environmental stances of Republicans 
and Democrats in ways that do not always hold true, it is useful to look at where the 
political parties typically fall on environmental issues in order to gain insight as to the 
future of the ESA.
The fact that the two political parties have failed to agree on environmental issues 
should not come as a shock. The Democrats and the Republicans have disagreed on 
issues for years. Environmental issues are no exception. Disagreements between the two 
parties may lead, or have already led, to the use of backlash politics in the debate over the 
reauthorization of the ESA. Backlash politics could possibly stall chances to forcefully 
reauthorize the ESA if Republicans concemed with property rights use the strategy. On 
the other hand, the environmental movement through the Democratic party may be able to 
use backlash politics to force the Republican leadership to reauthorize the ESA in its 
present substantive form.
Backlash politics is not a defined type of politics. The idea of backlash politics 
refers to a strategy that the political parties and opposing groups sometimes employ
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against each other on certain issues. Backlash politics, under my definition, is a political 
strategy used by an advocate to foster resentment against an opposing advocate. Instead 
of confronting opponents on real issues using conventional political debate, the opponents 
are attacked. By portraying opponents in a negative light on a particular issue, all other 
issues thQT stand for begin to carry the negativity that has become synonymous with that 
particular issue. Therein lies the strategy: lash out against an unpopular plank in a group’s 
platform, not against the entire platform. The attacked group comes to be associated with 
the unpopular issue and the entire group is guilty by association.
While political partisanship is found in many Congressional debates, the backlash 
position seeks to gaun a broader political advantage by exaggerating the differences 
between the parties, demonizing adversaries, and hampering compromise. Perhaps the 
reason for this is that perpetuating the controversy is considered more politically valuable 
than any compromise or settlement.
1 argue that backlash politics is conspicuous in the dd>ate over environmental 
issues in Congress and specifically in the process to reauthorize the ESA. Democrats and 
Republicans employ backlash politics when one party attacks the other party on a 
particular issue. For instance, private property advocates within the Republican party are 
attacking Democrats concemed with forcefully reauthoriang the ESA by portraying the 
Democrats as “takers” of private land without just compensation.*®^
One of the Republican party’s goals in the reauthorization process is to protect
*®̂As reflected in the Private Property Owners’ Bill of Rights, S. 953, 105th Cong. (1997) 
and in comments by Senate Majority Leader Lott, supra note 84.
27
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
private land and developers of those lands.**” Republicans may be representing the 
interests of those who argue that “environmental protection can come only at great 
economic cost to the American people”**** and that the ESA is a tool used “illegitimately” 
by «ivironmentalists to prevent development.*®*
Republican use of the politics of backlash is most noticeable in a bill like the 
“Private Property Owners’ Bill of Rights.”*®® This bill prioritizes property rights, private 
land, and development over the ESA’s true goal of species protection. Have the 
Republicans prioritized private land and development based on a perceived public outcry 
to protect property rights? Or, on the other hand, are Republicans just waving a property 
rights flag in order to use backlash politics against the Democrats?
In supporting property rights and development as opposed to a strongly 
reauthorized ESA, Republicans do not seem to be representing the prevailing American 
opinion. Almost half of the respondents in a recent opinion poll felt that the ESA is too 
weak and needs to be strengthened.*®̂  Only roughly one in five believed that the Act is 
too powerful in its protection of endmrgered species at the expense of property rights.*®*
* ® * I d
*®*Jeflfrey C. Ellis, On the Search for a Root Cause: Essentialist Tendencies in 
Environmental Discourse, in Uncommon Ground 263 (William Cronon ed., 1995).
*®*Rebecca Trounson and Mark I. Pinsky, Gnatcatcher Taken Off Threatened Species 
List. Los Angeles Times, May 3, 1994, at Al, A20.
*®®See generally S. 953, 105th Cong. (1997).
*®̂See the poll found at the ^pendix.
* ® * I d
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After the Republican party came to power in 1994, 55 percent of Republican voters felt 
their party could not be trusted to protect the environment. '̂"* Because it apparently 
enjoys little public support on this issue, the Republican party may be championing 
property rights in order to employ backlash politics against the Democratic party and 
Democrats’ usual pro-environmental stances
I believe that backlash politics have been effective against the environmental 
movement and thus, environmental objectives such as a forcefully reauthorized ESA. The 
environmental movement is saisceptible to backlash politics because it has, at times, 
alienated important segments of society: blue-collar workers employed in extractive 
industries and some private landowners whose lands have been “taken” for species 
protection under the ESA.
For example, many environmentalists think of work, especially blue-collar work, 
carried out in nature as environmentally damaging."" The obvious examples include 
logging and mining By opposing these certain types of work, environmentalists have 
opened their cause up to the politics of backlash. In alienating blue-collar workers, the 
environmental movement in turn alienates those workers’ families, friends, and the entire 
community as each depend on logging and mining dollars. These alienated communities 
lash out at the environmental movement in conversation, in the media, and in bumper
*“*David Maraniss & Michael Weisskopf, “Tell Newt to Shut Up!”. 14 (Touchstone 
Books 1996).
""Richard White, “Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?” Work 
and Nature, in Uncommon Ground 172 (William Cronon ed., 1995).
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stickers such as “Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?”*”
Soon, politicians take notice of the discontent with environmentalism within their 
districts and begin to participate in what has become popular: lashing out at 
environmentalists. This backlash comes about not because the environmentalists are 
wrong that the industries are bad for the environment, but because it is popular to lash out 
at what has become such an unpopular movement. All of a sudden, “environmentalists 
have ceded to the so-called wise-use movement valuable cultural terrain.”**̂ Some 
Republican politicians start running on a platform with planks that call for responsible 
resource development, instead of calling for more stringent environmental laws that 
en\nronmentalists would like to see."’ These Republicans are able to use 
environmentalists’ beliefs as fodder to get elected in districts where enwronmentalism has 
become unpopular.
I feel that environmentalism has become an unwitting pawn in the game of 
backlash politics. People that advocate for resource conservation are branded 
“environmentalists” like it was a bad thing and are portrayed as wanting to take your blue- 
collar job away. This carries over to the ESA reauthorization. Members of Congress 
calling for a forcefully reauthorized ESA are portrayed as wanting to tïüce your land away. 
So far, concern over private property rights has hindered the reauthorization process as
***!& at 171.
*'^Ii
**’See for example. Congressman Rick Hill’s (R-Montana) 1998 political advertisement 
calling for responsible resource development interposed with pictures of oil and gas 
pipelines and his flyfishing.
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Republican leaders concemed about property rights have been able to stop legitimate 
reauthorization bills that enjoyed tremendous bipartisan support."*
Why is this the case when it appears that the Republicans’ concerns over private 
property rights enjoy little public support?"* The answer is unclear and therefore, it may 
be possible for the Democratic party and the environmental movement to use backlash 
politics against the Republican party and private property rights advocates.
D. The Use of Backlash Politics-Against Property Rights Advocates
To counter the Republican party’s and private property interests’ use of backlash 
politics. Democrats and the environmental movement may be able to employ backlash 
politics against the Republican agenda. By portraying the Republican party as against the 
environment, the Democratic party might force a vote on the reauthorization of the ESA 
For instance, since the Democrats lost majorities in Congress in 1994, President Clinton 
(and the Democratic party by association) have made a steady comeback on the 
Republican party by defining themselves to be “in opposition to the Republicans on a set 
of specific issues, the environment prime among them.”"^
The environment became a difficult issue for the Republican party in the 104th 
Congress and the 105th Congress was no different. This can be explained in part because 
the Republican majority that came to power in 1994 tried to make too many big changes
"*As reflected in what happened to S. 1180 (discussed earlier).
"*See poll results in the Appendix.
n«David Maraniss & Michael Weisskopf, “Tell Newt to Shut Up!”. 14 (Touchstone 
Books 1996).
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to the environment too quickly.**’ Perhaps the results of this Democratic comeback are no 
better reflected than in the results of the 1998 mid-term elections. While the Republican 
party maintained majorities in Confess, Republicans lost members in the House of 
Representatives causing Representative Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia) to step down as 
Speaker of the House.
Backlash politics may prove to be a successful strategy for the Democratic party in 
the reauthorization debate. Because the environment has become such a difficult issue for 
the Republican party, the Democratic party may attempt to keep the pressure on the 
Republican party by using backlash politics in painting the Republican party as “anti- 
environmental.”*** By employing this strategy, the Democrats may have a chance in 
reauthorizing the ESA in its present force&l form by swaying public opinion on the issue 
away from the Republican party and toward the Democratic party.
E. Issues to Incorporate into a Compromise Reauthorization Bill
The future of the ESA is going to depend on opposing groups’ ability to 
compromise on the conflicting issues that will come up in the reauthorization process. 
Environmental conflicts between business/industry and government agencies charged with 
managing the environment have been going on for years. Over time, these two groups
**’Brent Walth, Environment in Congress Has Changed Since ‘94. The Oregonian, March
17. 1997, Al, A7.
***To some extent. Democrats have already used backlash politics claiming that 
CongressionW Republicans are “anti-environmental” and are conducting a “backdoor 
assault” on the environment. White House Denounces “Anti-Environmental” 
Amendments. Missoulian, September 30,1998, at A4 (taken from the Washington Post).
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have learned the art of compromise."*’ However, the conflict between private landowners 
and government agencies over the mandates of the ESA could be far more contentious. 
Landowners have little motivation to compromise their private lands in order to protect 
species as called for in the ESA.
Realizing the contentious nature of this debate. Congress is in the difficult position 
of having to reauthorize an act that is opposed by some private landowners . Given the 
Act’s unpopularity with this important group and the Republican majority’s stance in favor 
of protecting private property rights, the ESA could be significantly weakened under the 
reauthorization process. While many Americans generally think of themselves as 
environmentalists, most supporters of the environment do not feel so strongly about one 
particular environmental issue that they feel compelled to call or write their representatives 
in Congress to express their opinion on the environment. There will also probably be a 
lack of public involvement in the reauthorization process.
Few Americans probably know that the ESA is up for reauthorization. Fewer still 
understand the reauthorization process. This lack of public knowledge leaves the ESA 
susceptible to attacks from small special interest groups such as advocates for private 
property interests, industry, or even influential private landowners. These special interest
" ’See generally the New World Mine land exchange where Crown Butte Mining, Inc. has 
made a compromise with the government to not mine near Yellowstone National Park in 
exchange for mon^ and lands.
‘̂ See generally S. 953 and Senate Majority Leader Lott’s comments, supra note 84.
33
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
groups come together to further their common economic interests."' They also assemble 
to counter opposing interests.'^ In the case of the reauthorization of the ESA, private 
property rights advocates share the belief that they could be adversely affected by the 
ESA.
In order to build consensus among the competing groups in the ESA 
reauthorization process. Congress should continue to introduce bills such as Senate Bill 
1180 that are co-sponsored by Republicans and Democrats and are compromises between 
disputing groups. President Bill Clinton’s administration has tried to build consensus 
between supporters of the ESA and supporters of private property rights and has 
succeeded in some cases.Instead  of negotiating these deals like the Clinton 
administration. Congress should propose compromise reauthorization bills. Once a piece 
of legislation musters overwhelming support from various interested parties, the 
Congressional leadership will have little choice but to allow for this bill to be voted on and 
passed.
A compromise ESA reauthorization bill should have a number of characteristics. 
First, the bill should continue to realize the policies of the ESA as it was enacted in 1973. 
Congress declared the ESA’s policy: “Federal departments and agencies shall seek to
" ‘Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. 1 (Schocken Books 1971).
‘“ See generally Species Swaps: Environmentalists Decrv Deals on Protecting Critical 
Habitat. Missoulian, May 5, 1997, Al, A3 (the Administration is encouraging the use of 
HCPs to pacify developers of private lands on critical habitat) (this article was taken 
from the Associated Press wire).
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conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their authorities in 
furtherance of [these] purposes . . .  Second, a model bill should balance the interests 
of private landowners with the mandate of protecting species' habitat in the name of 
species preservation.
To ensure that both of these goals are achieved, the reauthorized ESA should keep 
the substantive provisions requiring species and ecosystems conservation while working in 
partnership with landowners to realize that conservation. Instead of granting 
administrative appeals to deny government access to private land, the government should 
offer property owners incentives to conserve and develop habitat for threatened and 
endangered species.
A possible means of encouraging private landowners to conserve habitat would be 
to oflFer them tax incentives.* ’̂ It can be cheaper for the property owner to develop 
habitat themselves than to have the state or federal government mandate and manage the 
conservation action. *“  Giving a tax reduction to landowners who develop a portion of 
their property as habitat benefits all parties involved, especially the plants and animals.
I believe that increasing funding to compensate those owning lands adversely 
affected by the ESA promotes an acrimomous relationship between those trying to save 
habitat and those that own the habitat. There is never enough money to make everyone
*^ESA § 2.
*̂’A^lliam J. Snape, IH & Heather L. Weiner, Recipe for Reauthorization of the 
Endangered Species Act. 5 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol y F. 61, 63 (1995) (footnote omitted).
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happy. However, working with the landowner to conserve species and habitat fosters 
better relationships with the owner while doing what is best for species. As the ground­
breaking conservationist Atdo Leopold once wrote, we should “[e]xamine each question 
in terms of what is ethically and esthetically nght, as well as economically expedient. A 
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.”*”
While working in partnership with a landowner is not something that can be 
legislated, it is something we all should work toward in order to protect threatened and 
endangered species. Developing habitat in partnership with property owners is less 
contentious than requiring them to comply with the mandates of the ESA. Becoming 
partners with landowners in protecting species gives them a stake in species conservation. 
Including landowners may give them a sense of pride for doing something good as 
opposed to “buying them off’ using a compensation plan. For a strategy to be truly 
effective, the majority of landowners will have to be willing participants in protecting 
species.
If a particular property owner is adamantly opposed to protecting species by 
complying with the ESA, a model reauthorization bill should include a provision that 
allows the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in cases of irreconcilable 
differences. ADR is a means for disputing parties to resolve their conflicts creatively and
*” Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac 224-25 (Oxford Umversity Press 1968) 
(1949).
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effectively without the contentiousness inherent in the litigation process.M ediation, a 
type of ADR, has proven to be a very effective means of resolving environmental 
disputes.*^ This would certainly hold true for a dispute arising under the ESA. Going 
through an ADR process is far less contentious, costly, and time-consuming than taking 
someone to court.*”
If developing habitat in partnership with landowners is impossible, the next best 
thing is to resolve conflicts using ADR. One of the bills introduced in the Senate had 
provisions calling for the use of ADR. Senate Bill 1181 would have given landowners a 
choice of remedies if the government were to fail to compensate them for diminishing the 
use or value of their land.'^* Landowners could have elected to solve their disputes using 
binding arbitration instead of resorting to litigation. *̂^
Senate Bill 1181 was a step in the right direction by providing the means to resolve 
disputes amicably through the ADR process. The bill did not go far enough though as it 
only made ADR an option, disputants still had the choice to resort to civil litigation.
‘“ American Bar Association, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An ADR Primer 1 (1989).
‘“ See generally Eric R. Max, Confidentialitv in Environmental Mediation. 2 N.Y.U.
Envtl. L. J. 210-223 (1993) and Raymond E. Tompkins, Mediation, the Mediator, and the 
Environment. 11 Natural Resources and Environment 27-30 (Summer 1996) (hereinafter 
Tompkins).
*” Tompkins at 27.
*3‘S. 1181, 105th Cong. § 8(1997).
*“ lsL
37
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Further, the type of ADR called for was binding arbitration '^  Mediation may be more 
effective in achieving the goals of both parties, and is typically more flexible than the 
binding decision handed down in arbitration.
It is important to note that ADR is not suited for all disagreements that come up 
under the ESA. Some limitations to the ADR process include the lack of public 
participation, the inability to set legal precedent, and the fact that there is no judicial 
review of ADR decisions. While ADR is a less-contentious means of solving smaller 
disputes, as between an individual landowner and a government agency, more complex 
legal issues that come up under the ESA should probably still be resolved in court.
A final means of balancing the interests of private landowners with the mandates of 
the ESA is to increase the protection of threatened and endangered species on Federal 
land in order to compensate for the development of private lands. Development of private 
lands is always going to be at odds with species protection. When possible though, if 
contiguous private land and Federally-owned land both provide habitat for threatened and 
endangered species, the Federal land should be less developed and have more stringent 
species protection regulations than private land. The government already owns Federal 
lands. Therefore, under this proposal, the government can avoid paying market prices in 
purchasing private land to use for species protection. This would save the government 
money and pacify private landowners whose lands will not have to be “conscripted to 
national zoological use” whether they were compensated for the use of their land or not. 
The Clinton Administration has endorsed this strategy of relying on Federal lands first in
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protecting species.T his compromise allows for species protection without private 
property interests having to shoulder the entire burden or any of the cost.
The thing to remember with the enforcement of the ESA on private land is that 
some parties are always going to be inconvenienced. The trick in the reauthorization 
process is reducing that inconvenience on private landowners while still ensuring the 
protection of threatened and endangered species.
V. Future Possibilities in the Reauthorization Process
It is difficult to predict the future of the ESA. Currently, the ESA’s Congressional 
authorization to spend money has expired and is in need of reauthorization. To 
reauthorize the ESA, a number of scenarios could come about W h Congress and the 
Administration both playing central roles.
A. The Congressional Reauthorization Process
One possibility is that the Senate Bill 1180 will be reintroduced and will pass in the 
106th Congress. Senator Lott’s concerns have supposedly been met and if a Republican is 
willing to be the lead sponsor of the bill in place of now-Govemor Kempthome, the bill 
may be popular enough with enough bipartisan support to pass in the Senate.
A second possibility in the reauthorization process is that the Republican majority 
will be swayed by the demands of advocates for private property rights and reauthorize the 
ESA in a very different form. If private landowners were to get their way, they would
‘̂ William K. Stevens, Future of the Endangered Species Act in Doubt as Law Is 
Debated. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1995, at C4.
"^Godfrey at 979.
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have every reason to want to see the ESA weakened if it ensured that their property rights 
were not infringed upon in the name of species or habitat conservation.
The third, and what I believe to be the most likely, possibility is that the ESA will 
not be reauthorized anytime soon Congress has shown little inclination to actually 
reauthorize the Act short of introducing numerous bills that have had little chance of 
passing. Some say that the 106th Congress will not attempt to tackle such a big 
environmental issue as reauthorization before the Presidential election in the year 2000.*^ 
With Vice President Al Gore, one of the nation’s most recognized environmentalists, a 
leading candidate to be the next President, Congressional Republicans may not want a 
major piece of environmental legislation to pass as it might help Gore’s chances."^ For 
the same reason. President Clinton and his Administration will be likely to continue to 
advocate for big environmental issues such as a reauthorized ESA if it would help keep a 
Democrat in the Wlute House.
Congress has been appropriating money to the ESA keeping it in its current 
substantive form. This will likely remain the status quo until the 107th Congress if the 
106th Congress chooses not to reauthorize the ESA.
B. The Administration's Role in Species Protection
President Clinton’s Administration is becoming more involved in the debate over
’̂ An idea reflected by both members of Senator Baucus’ staff and the staff at 
NESARC. Telephone interview with Brian Kuehl, Senator Baucus’ Legislative Aide for 
Natural Resource Issues (November 3, 1998) and Telephone Interview with Jack Mingus, 
lobbyist for NESARC (November 12, 1998).
"^Telephone Interview with Jack Mingus, lobbyist for NESARC (November 12, 1998).
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the reauthorization of the Act, especially Interior Secretary Babbitt who is becoming a 
powerful figure in every environmental debate."' To have any success with environmental 
issues. Congressional Republicans are now finding it necessary to temper their stance on 
the environment and to seek and get the approval of Secretary Babbitt before 
legislating."’ This state of affairs possibly signals a power shift in the ESA reauthorization 
debate: the failure of the two political parties to meaningfully compromise on 
environmental issues in Congress may signal a larger role in species protection for the 
Administration
The process by which legislation becomes law in the United States is set forth in 
the Constitution; Congress enacts legislation and the President signs it into law. At times 
though, laws are made without using this process. There are a number of ways for a 
President or Congressional leadership to circumvent the usual legislative process. A 
recent example is the budget bill passed in the last days of the 105th Congress. Instead 
of going through committee and being debated in both houses of Congress, the spending 
bill **was compiled in closed-door meetings attended by a handful of lawmakers and top 
administration officials.”" ' Senator Baucus described the process of passing this bill as
"'Brent Walth, Environment in Congress Has Changed Since *94. The Oregonian, March 
17, 1997, Al, A7.
‘“ See generally H R. 4328, 105th Congress (1998).
" ‘Baucus Votes Against Spending Bill After Working to Secure Funds. Missoulian, 
October 22, 1998, at A4.
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“oligarchy, not democracy.”*̂^
The passage of this spending bill, with the Administration playing a large role, may 
signal the need for the Administration to play a large role in securing the reauthorization 
of the ESA. As then-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich said, “If [Congress and the 
Administration] don’t work together on big issues, nothing gets done.”'̂ ^
President Clinton’s Administration has already played a laige role in reforming the 
ESA. By allowing the increased use of HCPs, the Administration has struck a balance 
between species protection and private land rights. While Congress authorized the use of 
HCPs in 1982, it was not until 1994 when the Administration encouraged their use on 
private land that HCPs became common.'^ Before 1994, there were only 20 active HCPs, 
at the end of 1997 there were more than 200.*̂ *
Another example of the Administration taking the lead role in the reauthorization 
debate is its role in championing the “no surprises” clause. While it was Senate Bill 1180 
that called for a “no surprises” clause and the increased use of HCPs, this bill would have 
merely codified the Administration’s ESA reforms. Congress’ best reauthorization bill 
was made up of Administration proposals.
Given the Adnunistration’s role and Congress’ lack of a role in the reauthorization
142IsL
‘̂ ’Katherine Q. Seelye, Bv Wide Margin. House Passes $500 Billion Budget Bill. N.Y. 
Times, October 21,1998, at A20.
*^John H. Cushman, Jr., The Endangered Species Act Gets a Makeover. N. Y. Times, 
June 2, 1998, at D2.
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debate, any group seeking beneficial change to the ESA should focus its lobbying efforts 
on the Administration and especially Secretary Babbitt. If Congress waits or fails to 
reauthorize the ESA until after the next Presidential election, then all changes to the ESA 
will have been made by the current Administration. This Administration has shown a 
willingness, and has had some success, reforming the ESA Groups concemed with the 
future of the ESA should focus on how the Administration might continue to reform the 
ESA.
VL Conclusion
The Endangered Species Act is the most significant and substantive set of laws 
designed to protect endangered plant and animal species ever enacted. The law is a 
powerful species conservation mandate. This powerful mandate has alarmed many who 
believe that the needs of plants and animals are being put before the needs of humans. 
Whether it be the short-term shutting down of a dam project as in TVA v. Hill or the 
conservation of spotted owl habitat leading to the reduction of a timber harvest in Sweet 
Home, the ESA has made as many enemies in the name of species protection as it has 
fiiends.
Because this powerful law has a number of detractors, reauthorizing the ESA has 
been a troublesome process. There are no easy answers as to how to solve the most 
difficult issues in reauthorization. I would submit that whatever the answer, the ESA must 
stay true to the original purpose and policy of the Act as enacted by Congress; the ESA 
should remain a substantive act that conserves threatened and endangered species. At the 
same time, the needs of private landowners adversely affected by species preservation
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must also be met.
Is it possible to preserve species while protecting private property interests? Can 
these seemingly contradictory goals be achieved through the reauthorization process? The 
only viable answer is “yes,” or at least, “hopefully.” A politically acceptable solution will 
require balancing species protection with property rights. Private landowners whose lands 
are affected by the ESA will likely vote with their pocket books. These people, and thus 
their representatives in Congress, are not going to sit idly by allowing Congress to 
“conscript” their private lands in the name of species protection.
Many scientists maintain that the world is in the midst of a mass extinction of plant 
and animal species due to humans, the most dominant species on E a r t h . T o  protect 
endangered species effectively, especially from humans, these species must be protected 
on both public and private lands. Plant and animal species cannot tell the difference 
between public and private land, arbitrary social boundaries, they live and grow wherever 
they can thrive. However, the reauthorized ESA will have to make certain allowances for 
private landowners as individual citizens cannot be expected to shoulder the entire burden 
of making their land suitable habitat for threatened and endangered species. The 
reauthorized ESA will have to be a compromise that protects the interests of these private 
landowners while also protecting the nation’s threatened and endangered species.
In order to reauthorize the ESA, Congress and/or the Administration have to 
produce a compromise bill or deal that enjoys broad, bipartisan support. Senate Bill 1180 
is probably the best option for a future Congress to reauthorize the ESA Another means
‘̂ Maijorie Connelly, To Manv. Out of Sight. . .. N. Y. Times, June 2, 1998, at D8.
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to realize compromise is for the Adimnistration to take a lead role in the reauthorization 
dd)ate and make a deal on the ESA. Whatever the case, compromise on the ESA should 
not come at the expense of the species protection.
While we as Americans rely on the government to ensure species protection 
through laws like the ESA, I believe species protection must become a goal for everyone. 
Perhaps Aldo Leopold said it best almost 50 years ago:
There is a clear tendency in American conservation to relegate to government all 
necessary jobs that private landowners fail to perform.. . .  At what point will 
governmental conservation, like the mastodon, become handicapped by its own 
dimensions? The answer, if there is any, seems to be in a land ethic, or some other 
force which assigns more obligation to the private landowner.. . .  When the 
private landowner is asked to perform some unprofitable act for the good of the 
community, he today assents only with outstretched palm.. . .  [A] system of 
conservation based solely on economic self-interest is hopelessly lopsided. It tends 
to ignore, and thus eventually eliminate, many elements in the land community that 
lack commercial value, but that are (as fw as we know) essential to its healthy 
functioning. . . .  An ethical obligation on the part of the private owner is the only 
visible remedy for these situations."^
Maybe the real answer to the question of how to save species has little to do with 
the reauthorization of the ESA. The job of true species protection might not lie only with 
the government. If endangered species are to be truly protected forever, the job is not just 
the government’s, it is all of ours.
" ’Aldo Leopold, A Sand Countv Almanac 213-14 (Oxford University Press 1968) 
(1949).
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APPENDIX
The Netizen
Daily Poll Results
KEY; percentage | raw votes 
Total responses: 298
Certain members of the US 
Congress are pushing for major 
changes to the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA), arguing that 
the act protects wildlife habitat at 
the expense of private property 
owners' rights. What's your take 
on congressional and lobbyist 
proposals to weaken the ESA?
44.1 I 130 . .. The act is too weak
and needs to be broadened
19.01 56 . . .  The act is too broad
and needs to be weakened
16.9 I 50 . . .  What’s the
difference? We're all doomed
15.3 I 45 .. . Pass the monkeywrench
04,7 I 14 .. . The notion of "endangered species " 
is a radical environmentalist hoax
SOURCE: http://www.hotwired.com/netizen/netizenpoll/96/25^ndex2a.html
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